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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation: JELCO, INC., 
a corporation: and CENTRAL UTAH 
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, 
a body corporate and politic, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
- - - - - - - -
vs. Case No. 16208 
STRUCTO-LITE ENGINEERING, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages arising from the negligent 
construction of a fiberglass storage tank, fabricated by Appellant. 
Respondents claim a right to recovery on theories of negligence 
and breach of contract, including express warranty. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury in October and November, 
1978. Following the completion of the evidence, the trial court 
ruled that Appellant Structo-Lite was negligent,as a matter of 
la~ and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the 
damages sustained by Respondents Jacobsen Construction Company, 
Inc., Jelco, Inc., and the Central Utah Water Conservancy 
Jistrict. At the request of Appellant a special verdict was 
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submitted to the jury. The response to the question of 
negligence of the Appellant was directed by the court. The 
jury found that Appellant also breached its warranties to and 
ita contract with Respondents. The jury responded affirmatively 
to the questions of contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk by Jacobsen and the Conservancy District, and apportioned 
fault among the parties as follows: Appellant Structo-Lite 
70%, Jacobsen 20%, and the Conservancy District 10%. The 
jury answered no to Appellant's claim that Third Party 
Defendant Templeton, Linke and Associates was negligent. The 
jury assessed damages to Jacobsen in the sum of $370,987.11 
and to the Conservancy District in the sum of $51,003.66. In 
keeping with the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, the trial judge 
extended judgment in favor of Jacobsen and against Appellant 
for the sum of $296,789.69, plus interest of $77,409.26, for a 
total of $374,198.95 and in favor of the Conservancy District 
and against Appellant for the sum of $45,903.29,plus interest of 
$11,972.59, for a total of $57, 875.88. 
T 
I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal Structo-Lite does not complain of the method 
used by the trial court in allocating the damages among the 
respective parties, but claims that no damages should have been 
awarded in favor of Respondents because of the jurys' finding on 
the issue of assumption of risk. 
Respondents request this Court to affirm the lower court's 
holding that pursuant to the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, 
assumption of the risk is no longer a complete bar to recovery 
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in the State of Utah. By way of cross appeal, Respondent• 
also seek a determination by this Court that the trial court 
erred in the following particulars: 
(a) In permitting Appellant to amend its Answer on the 
morning of trial to assert the defenses of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk. 
(b) In refusing to find, as a matter of law, or to 
direct a verdict that Respondents were not contributorily 
negligent and that Respondents did not assume the risk. 
(c) In denying Respondents' Motion to Amend their Complaint 
to raise as an additional ground for relief Appellant's willful 
and reckless conduct. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein, Jacobsen Construction 
Company, Inc. and Jelco, Inc. (hereinafter: "Jacobsen" or 
Respondents"), as joint venturers, were the general contractors 
for construction o£ the Jordan Water Treatment Plant located at 
Bluffdale, Utah. Plaintiff and Respondent Central utah Water 
Conservancy District (hereinafter: "the Conservancy District" 
or "Respondent"), was and is the owner of the water treatment 
plant. Defendant and Appellant herein, Structo-Lite Engineering, 
Inc. (hereinafter: "Structo-Lite" or "Appellant"), was a 
fiberglass products fabricator which, pursuant to a subcontract 
with Jacobsen, supplied fiberglass products which it had 
fabricated, including six fiberglass tanks, for installation in 
the Jordan Water Treatment Plant. Third-Party Defendant Templeton, 
Linke and Associates were the project engineers and prepared the 
plans and specifications for construction of the water treatment 
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plant. 
In 1972 Jacobsen contracted with the Conservancy District 
to build a water treatment plant at Bluffdale, Utah. Plans 
and specifications for the plant and all other construction 
documents had been previous!¥ prepared by Templeton, Linke 
-
and Associates. The plans for the water treatment plant 
contemplated the installation of six large fiberglass tanks, 
approximately 12-1/2 feet in diameter and 24 feet high, on the 
third floor of the building which housed the main water treatment 
facilities. It was intended that the tanks would be used for 
storage of liquid alum, a chemical commonly used in the 
purification of culinary water. The building was designed to 
permit the tanks to extend through circular openings in the fourth 
and fifth floors. Liquid alum was to be fed into the tanks 
through a system of pipes extending to the fifth floor and 
to be drained from the tanks by means of a gravity feed system 
through pipes attached near the tank bases. (Exh. 3-D-21). 
Shortly after the contract was awarded, Mr. David Bevan, 
president of Structo-Lite, telephoned Jacobsen and expressed a 
desire to provide all fiberglass items and materials required by 
the plans and specifications. (Tr. 332, 333). At the first meetir.: 
between Bevan and Mr. Dick Berg, an agent for Jacobsen, Bevan 
presented Berg with a business card which stated: "Structo-
Lite Fiberglass Engineering, Inc., David Bevan, President." 
(Tr. 13,335). At this initial conference Bevan represented that 
his company would be able to fabricate fiberglass tanks which 
would meet the plans and specifications prepared by Templeton, 
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Linke and Associates. He also outlined to Berg his 
and previous experience, including construction of a number of 
other tanks for major industries in the area, such as 
Kennecott Copper Corporation and Solar Salt. (Tr. 336). 
Based upon Bevan's representations and verbal bid, 
Jacobsen prepared and delivered to Structo-Lite a standard fora 
purchase order to purchase all of the fiberglass items required 
for the water treatment plant, including the six liquid alum 
storage tanks. (Tr. 337). The purchase order provided 
that Structo-Lite would supply the tanks and other items to 
meet all plans and engineering specifications and that they 
would be warranted by Structo-Lite as to quality of workman-
ship and materials. (Exh. P-4). Bevan read the purchase order, 
including the provisions covering warranty of workmanship and 
materials and compliance with ;the plans and specifications. 
He then signed the purchase order and returned a copy to 
Jacobsen. (Tr. 24-26). 
As required by the purchase order, Mr. Bevan prepared on 
behalf of Structo-Lite several letters for submission to 
Jacobsen which described the fiberglass materials and in 
particular the liquid alum storage tanks Structo-Lite would 
build. In these letters Bevan again represented that all 
materials furnished would be "suitable and proper" for the 
purposes and uses intended (Exh. P-8, P-10, P-11) and warranted 
the quality of the materials and workmanship of the fiberglass 
products he had agreed to supply. As a matter of course, the 
letters were forwarded by Jacobsen to Templeton, Linke and 
.:..ssociates for their review. (Tr. 344). Bevan arranged to have 
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shop drawings prepared showing the construction of the liquid 
alum storage tanks. The drawings were delivered to Jacobsen 
and then forwarded to Templeton, Linke and Associates. (Tr.340), 
(Thecontract between Jacobsen and the Conservancy District 
provided that Jacobsen had no responsibility for review of 
or authority to approve shop drawings or other representations 
of suppliers, manufacturers or subcontractors such as "suitable 
and proper" statements. This responsibility and authority 
rested solely and exclusively with Templeton, Linke and 
Associates.) (Exh. 3-D-22). 
In June, 1973, Structo-Lite delivered to the project the 
first four tanks it had manufactured. The remaining two tanks 
were delivered the following November. (Tr.665,668). Prior to 
delivery of any tanks, Mr. Harvey Wright, the project super-
intendent for Jacobsen, visited the Structo-Lite shop. Wright 
noticed that the tanks appeared to be slightly out-of-round. 
He conveyed this information to Mr. Hutchinson, the representative 
for the Conservancy District,and then verified that the areas in 
the water treatment building where the tanks were to be located 
had sufficient tolerance to permit the tanks to protrude through t!· 
holes in the floors. (Tr. 662,663). Hutchinson also visited the 
Structo-Lite shop. Thereafter, he contacted American Testing 
Laboratories and requested that they visit Structo-Lite as 
part of the normal inspection of suppliers and manufacturers 
who were providing materials for the water treatment plant. 
(Tr.471,472). Hutchinson received reports from American Testin~ 
Laboratories describing their inspection of Structo-Lite's 
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facilitites and fabricating processes. (Tr. 473). Mr. Berg 
also visited the Structo-Lite shop to determine when the tanka 
would be delivered. However, he made no inspection of the tanka 
or evaluation of their quality and was not qualified to do so. 
(Tr.348) 
When the tanks arrived at the job site, Harvey Wright 
observed that some of the temporary supports used to maintain 
roundness had failed in transit, causing the tanks to appear 
somewhat elliptical at the open end and resulting in damage 
to the flanges located at the tops of the tanks. He and Harvey 
Hutchinson discussed the need for repairs to the top flanges 
and the fact that some of the tanks were missing outlets and 
tie-down brackets. (Tr. 667). Mr. Bevan was contacted. He 
indicated that he would come to the job site to make the 
necessary repairs and install the remaining connections. (Tr. 668). 
Mr. Steve Jacobsen visited the Structo-Lite facilities after 
the first four tanks had been delivered to expedite delivery 
by Structo-Lite of the remaining two tanks. Having no experience 
in the manufacture of fiberglass tanks, no effort was made by 
him to determine the quality of the work being done by Structo-
Lite. (Tr. 624,642). 
The following spring (1974) and prior to the completion of 
the job, all of the tanks were tested for leaks. Testing was 
accomplished by filling the tanks with water and observing if 
there were any leaks. (Tr. 485). Four of the six tanks had 
:cn",or water leaks, however, the tank that subsequently failed 
jld not. (Tr.ll9). structo-Lite was contacted about the leaks. 
:t sent a crew to the job site to Make the necessary repairs. 
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Thereafter the tanks were determined to be water-tight. (Tr.486). 
Just prior to placing the plant into operation, a seven-day 
test of the plant facilities was conducted. The plant passed 
the test and was pronounced ready for operation and treatment 
of water commenced about the end of May 1974. Liquid- alum 
was first delivered to the plant May 28, 1974 (Tr. 230) and was 
put in one of the tanks and used from that tank. On July 12, 1974, 
the Conservancy District began to fill the tank designated as the 
south center tank with liquid alum. By July 15, this tank was 
filled to a depth of 20 feet 6 inches. (Tr. 232,234). On 
July 16, while making his daily rounds, Mr. Richard Nelson, 
the plant operator, noticed liquid alum leaking from a small 
hairline sized opening near the south side of the south center 
tank. As he observed the leak, a second leak erupted. Becoming 
concerned, Nelson determined to lessen the pressure in the tank. 
He left the area and had just reached the floor immediately 
below the level of the tank when it erupted, spreading alum 
throughout the entire building. (Tr. 237,238). 
Even though cleanup of the alum and repair work was begun 
immediately, the flooding of the building with liquid alum 
resulted in substantial damage to the heating and electrical 
systems in the plant. It was 13 days before the plant was made 
operational again, but it was almost a year before removal of 
the alum from the building was deemed completed. (Tr.240). 
However, there is still evidence of alum and corrosion in 
various portions of the building. (Tr.532). 
This action was brought by Jacobsen and the Conservancy 
District to recover from Structo-Lite the damages incurred as a 
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result of the tank failure. Structo-Lite brouqht a third-party 
complaint against Templeton, Linke and Associates claiminq that 
the building design and tank specifications were inadequate, 
thereby causing or contributing to the damaqes incurred. 
At the conclusion of the evidence a special verdict was 
submitted to the jury. The court directed a verdict with respect 
to the negligence of Structo-Lite, having determined from the 
eveidence that as a matter of law, Structo-Lite was neqliqent and 
such negligence was a proximate cause of the damages. In its 
answers to the special verdict, the jury found that Jacobsen 
and the Conservancy District were contributorily negligent and 
assumed the risk of injury to the extent 20\ and 10\ 
respectively. With respect to the claim of Structo-Lite Engineering 
against Templeton, Linke and Associates, the jury found that 
Templeton, Linke and Associates was not negligent. 
Based upon the jury's answers to the special verdict, 
the trial court entered judgment on behalf of Jacobsen and the 
Conservancy District, computing the amount of the damages by 
applying the provisions of the Utah Comparative Negligence 
Statute to thedamageamount determined by the jury. Structo-
Lite has appealed on the theory that because Jacobsen and the 
Conservancy District were found to have assumed the risk, they 
are completely barred from recovery. 
Jacobsen and the Conservancy District have cross-appealed 
on three issues: 
1. The trial court erred in permitting Structo-Lite to 
raise at the trial the issues of contributory negligence and 
assu~ption of the risk; 
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2. · The trial court erred in refusing to grant the motion 
of Jacobsen and the Conservancy District for a directed verdict 
on all of their claims and in refusing to grant a directed verdict 
in their favor with respect to Structo-Lite's defenses of 
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk: and 
3. The trial court erred in denying the motion of 
Jacobsen and the Conservancy District to amend their complaint 
after completion of the testimony to assert as an additional 
ground for relief against Structo-Lite the willful and reckless 
conduct of Structo-Lite. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. UNDER THE UTAH COMPARATIVE NBGLIGENCB S'l'A'l'UTB, 'l'BB 
DOCTRINE OF "ASSUMPTION OF RISK" NO LONGER CONSTITtJ'l'BS A BAR 
TO RECOVERY. 
In adopting the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-27-37 (1953, as amended), the Legislature swept 
aside the common law doctrine theretofore followed by the Utah 
courts to the effect that a plaintiff who claimed injury due to 
the negligence of another was barred from recovery if he was in 
the least wise contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk 
of injury. The new law adopted in 1973 provides: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action 
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in 
injury to person or property if such negligence was not as 
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person 
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the person recovering. As used 
in this act, "Contributory negligence" includes "assumption 
of the risk." 
The statutory language is straightforward. The first phrase 
indicates that contributory negligence is no longer a complete 
bar to recovery in an action based on negligence. The last 
sentence makes clear that for purposes of the act, "assumption 
of the risk" is now to be treated in the same manner as 
contributory negligence; namely, it shall no longer be a complete 
bar to recovery. No other reading or interpretation of the statute 
is or can be justified, the lengthy and convuluted argument in 
Appellant's Brief notwithstanding. 
This court has already had an opportunity to interpret the 
· Statute as it applies to the doctrine Utah Comparative Negl~gence 
f h · k" ;n the case of Rigtrup v. Strawberry of "assumption o t e r~s ~ _ _ 
Water Users Association, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah, 1977) · In that 
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action the defendant raised the defense of assumption of the risk i 
as well as the defense of contributory negligence. In answer to'\ 
special interrogatories, the jury found the plaintiff to be 90% 
negligent and the defendant to be 10% negligent. Pursuant to 
this verdict, the trial court entered judgment for the defendant, 
ostensibly under the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute. on 
appeal the plaintiff claimed that the trial judge erred when he 
instructed the jury as to the defense of "assumption of the risk,' 
having already instructed the jury on the issue of contributocy 
negligence. The opinion of this Court discusses the general 
interrelationship of the two defenses: 
It [assumption of the risk] has sometimes been said to be 
but a specialized aspect of contributory negligence in that 
it can be intermingled and fused with other aspects thereof 
in certain circumstances. It is also sometimes said to be 
something separate from contributory negligence as it 
undoubtedly can be in some circumstances. Id. at 1250. 
But this Court then went on to hold that the doctrine of assumptic 
of the risk clearly falls within the ambit of the Utah ComparativE 
Negligence Statute: 
Where there is a known danger, the risk of which is voluntan. 
assumed by a party, such action may well fall within the lac.\ 
of due care which constitutes negligence and also may be 
correctly termed an assumption of risk. If such be the ... 
situation, the party should be charged with the respons~blll: 
for his conduct, by whatever term it may be called; and the. 
comparative negligence statute quoted above should be a~pl~ 
as the trial court correctly did in this case. (Emphas~s 
added) Id. at 1250. 
Appellant expends a great many pages of its Brief arguing that the 
doctrines of "assumption of the risk" and "contributory negligence 
are distinct and separate defenses. Respondents have no quarrel 
with Appellant on that point. Respondents merely point out tha: 
l . q 
regardless of whether the defenses are separate or over appLn .• 
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the Legislature has mooted the issue as to whether either is a 
complete bar to recovery by a claimant. By statute, they are now 
to be treated in the same manner when raised in defense to a 
claim of negligence. Appellant states in its Brief that 
"assumption of the risk" and "contributory negligence• have long 
been recognized in this jurisdiction as distinctly separate 
defenses. (Defendant's Brief at 6) Respondents submit, however, 
that the Legislature added the last sentence to the statute--•As 
used in this act 'contributory negligence' includes 'assumption 
of the risk'"--precisely to make it quite clear that for purposes 
of comparing the conduct of the respective parties, there is no 
longer a viable distinction. Moreover, this Court explicitly held 
in the Rigtrup case that, indeed, this was the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting the new law: 
That our conclusion just stated is the correct one under our 
law is supported not only by the reasoning just stated and 
the cases cited, but is made abundantly clear by the fact 
that the legislature, apparently in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding thereon, appended the last sentence as 
quoted above that: As used in this act, "contributory 
negligence" includes "assumption of the risk." That 
sentence indicates a clear legislative intent to recognize 
the doctrine of "assumption of risk" as an aspect of 
contributory negligence in Utah law. (Emphasis added) Id. 
at 1250. 
In light of the above judicial pronouncement, Respondents 
are frankly mystified by Appellant's temerity in baldly asserting 
that to read the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute as equating 
assumption of the risk with contributory negligence is "a 
conclusion not substantiated in the case law of this jurisdiction" 
(Appellant's Brief at 6), particularly in view of the fact that 
t · 1 from the R1.'gtruo case in its own Brief~ Appellant cites ex ens1.ve y _ 
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In an effort to find support for its position, Appellant has 
referred to the case of Becker v. Beaverton School District No. 
!!• 551 P.2d 498 (Ore. App., 1976), a decision by the intermediate 1 
appellate court of Oregon. As is evident from a reading of the 
opinion, the case stands alone. Prior to the decision of the 
appellate court but after the trial, the Oregon legislature 
amended the Oregon Comparative Negligence Statute so that the 
decision in the case would have no effect on any other factual 
situation. 
In Becker the plaintiff was an elementary school student who 
was injured on a piece of playground equipment, a climbing 
structure made of wooden timbers. The structure had a hole in 
the center. Playground rules forbade students from jumping across 
the hole. Plaintiff was injured when, in contravention of the 
rules, he attempted to leap across the opening. As an affirmative 
defense to plaintiff's action, the defendant school district 
alleged specific facts by which it claimed that the plaintiff had 
assumed the risk of injury. The court termed the defendant's 
allegations as pleading assumption of the risk in its "primary 
sense." In this connection, the Oregon court discussed at some 
length the development of Oregon law with respect to "assumption 
of the risk" and concluded that Oregon recognizes a "primary" 
sense (no duty on the part of the defendant to protect plaintiff 
from a risk) and a "secondary" sense (a phase of contributory 
negligence) of "assumption of the risk." This material dichotor: 
is blissfully ignored by Appellant in its efforts to equate the 
Oregon result to Utah law. Appellant also ignores the empha 515 
I 
I 
I 
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placed by the Oregon court on the fact that the defendant in 
Becker had pleaded with specificity what the court termed to be 
the defense in its primary sense. At no point in the case at 
bar has Appellant ever done more than claim generally that 
Respondents "assumed the risk." Appellant has made no effort 
to plead specifically the facts which it claims establish such 
a defense, nor has Appellant even bothered to set forth in its 
Brief whether the evidence at the trial indicated assumption of 
the risk in its "primary" or "secondary" sense--the key issue on 
which the Oregon court's decision turns. Instead, Appellant 
merely argues that if it pleads "assumption of the risk• and the 
jury so finds, it avoids the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute--
a position which is not even supported by the unique decision of 
the Oregon Appellate Court. 
In a further effort to cloud and obscure the clear meaning 
of the Utah law, Appellant claims a similarity between the Utah 
and Oregon statutes, then speculates that the Oregon Legislature 
must have recognized that the Oregon Comparative Negligence 
Statute passed in 1973 did not eliminate assumption of the risk 
as a complete bar because in 1975 it amended the act to provide 
in part that: 
The doctrine of implied assumption of the risk is abolished. 
(Emphasis added) ORS 18.475/0regon Laws 1975, Chapter 599, 
§5. 
Appellant's speculation is unfounded, as reference to the 
legislative history of the 1975 amendment establishes. A memorandum 
Jud1.c1·ary Committee covering the 1975 amendments to the Oregon House 
d Statute abolishing implied assumption re:erring to the propose 
of the risk states: 
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Section 5 9abolishes the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk. Ritter v. Beals, 225 Ore. 504 (1961) subsumed 
under contributory negligence the form of assumption of the 
risk in which plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably . 
encounters a known risk~ this type of assumption of the risk 'I 
is unaffected by. Section 5 and should be plead as contributor; 
negligence. Pla1ntiff's reasonable assumption of the risk ·1 
is unaffected by Section 5 and should be plead as contributor. 
negligence. Plaintiff's reasonable assumpti~ij of the risk · 
or "implied consent" is no longer a defense. This resolves! 
the anomaly arguably possible under present law that i 
plaintiff's reasonable conduct might bar recovery completely ' 
while unreasonable conduct leads to the possibility of I 
partial recovery. (Emphasis added) Appendix G, House 
Judiciary Committee Memorandum, 5/25/75, at 2. -----
From the above statement, it is clear that the Oregon 
Legislature presumed, unlike both Appellant herein and the court 
in Becker, that "assumption of the risk" was already included 
under the Oregon Comparative Negligence Act. The 1975 amendment 
was designed only to guard against what the legislature saw as a 
possibility that the statute could be misconstrued--precisely as 
Appellant has done in its Brief herein. The Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act is clearly written and easily interpreted. This 
Court has already held in Rigtrup, supra, that assumption of the 
risk is included within the purview of that Act. Appellant's 
efforts to confuse and obfuscate the obvious meaning of the 
statute and the clear intention of the Utah Legislature should 
be rejected by this Court. 
9The courts of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Washi~gton, and California 
have abolished implied assumption of the r~sk as an independent 
doctrine. Connecticut has accomplished the same result by statu~ 
Conn. Pub. Act. No. 73-622, Sec. ic. 
lOaf course if defendant has no duty toward the Plaintiff there 
is no liability. 
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POINT II. "ASSUMPTION OF RISK" IS NOT A VALID DBPBIISB '1'0 
RESPONDENTS' CLAIM BASED UPON BREACH OF EXPRESS ~
AND CAN NEITHER BAR SUCH A CLAIM NOR ACT TO REDUCE RBSPO~I' 
RIGHT OF RECOVERY. 
Respondents' Complaint raise~ in addition to a claim of 
negligence, causes of action for the failure of Appellant to 
deliver tanks which conformed to the express written warranties 
it had provided to Respondents. As is correctly stated by 
Appellant in its Brief, under Utah Code Annot., S70A-2-313 (1953, 
as amended), an action brought upon a contract claiming failure 
to provide a product which complied with the contract specifications 
is an action for breach of express warranty. In such cases the 
law governing express warranty applies. Appellant, however, has 
incorrectly stated in its Brief what that law is. 
In support of its claim that assumption of risk remains a 
bar to a breach of warranty action, Appellant quotes from two 
secondary authorities: White and Summers, Uniform Commercial 
Code (1972 Ed.), and Restatement of Torts 2d, §402A. Neither 
quotation cited by Appellant has anything to do with claims which 
are based on a breach of express warranty. The statement from 
White and Summers deals with defenses in breach of implied 
warranty cases as a careful reading of the remainder of that 
chapter and the chapter on express warranties makes clear. The 
quotation from the Restatement of Torts 2d comes from the section 
concerning "strict liability," a point of law not even in issue 
in the case at bar. 
As to the question of whether assumption of the risk can be 
asserted against a claim based on breach of express warranty, 
h been Unab le to locate any decision by this Court. Respondents ave 
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However, Respondents direct the Court's attention to a decision 
of the Kansas Supreme Court, Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 
214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 (1974), wherein that court examined 
carefully the Kansas statute on express warranties which is 
identical to its Utah counterpart. In that case the plaintiffs 
were buyers of infected cattle which had been expressly warranted 
by the sellers to be free from disease. Finding that the lower 
court erred in failing to instruct on express warranty, the Kansas 
court succinctly stated: I 
Contributory negligence and assumption of risk cannot be 
asserted against the buyers, and the buyers are not obligateC 
to show particular reliance upon the express warranties, 
since they are contractual. All the buyers are required to 
establish is that the express warranties were made and that 
they were false, thereby establishing a breach of the 
contract. Id. at 293. 
In the instant action there is no doubt that Respondents 
established at trial Appellant's express warranties and Appellant' 
breach thereof. Appellant does not even contest that issue on 
appeal. The import of the above statement from the Kansas court 
is clear. Not only are Appellant's claims of contributory 
negligence and assumption of the risk of no avail against 
Respondents' claims for breach of contract and express warranty, 
such claims cannot act to reduce Respondents' damages, as is 
otherwise permitted in an action based on negligence. The jury 
having found that Appellant breached its contract and express 
warranties, Respondents are entitled to the full amount of the 
damages which were awarded. This Court should direct the trial 
judge to enter an order accordingly. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING APPBLLABT 
TO RAISE THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTIQa 
OF THE RISK AT THE TRIAL. 
When this action was initially filed by Jacobsen and the 
Conservancy District, Structo-Lite filed an Answer dated De~r 
20, 1974, in which it alleged as separate defenses: 
(a) "The rupture of the tank and the damage of which 
Plaintiffs complain were proximately caused or solely caused 
by the negligence of the Plaintiffs which was equal to or · 
greater than Defendant's negligence, if any:• and 
(b) "Plaintiffs assumed the risk of loss." 
(Answer, Third Defense and Sixth Defense) 
Thereafter Structo-Lite filed an Amended Answer dated August 
27, 1976, in which it asserted merely that "Any recovery awarded 
the Plaintiffs should be reduced in the proportion of their own 
contributory negligence." (Amended Answer, paragraph 7) The 
Amended Answer did not contain the third and sixth defenses raised 
in the original Answer, nor did it provide that such defenses 
were to be considered a part of or incorporated into the Amended 
Answer. 
It was not until the morning of the trial that Respondents 
became aware Structo-Lite still asserted or sought to assert the 
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk raised 
in the original Answer. 
At that time and over the objection of Respondents, the 
court permitted Structo-Lite to assert the additional defenses 
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk which had been 
deleted from Appellant's Amended Answer. (Tr. 46, 47) In 
gr 3 nting Structo-Lite's Motion to Amend its Amended Answer on 
· 1 ;nclude the defenses it had waived, the the morning of tr~a to ~ 
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trial court committed prejudicial error which should be rectified 
by this Court on appeal. 
The law with respect to the effect of an amended pleading 
is clear. Whenever a pleading is amended by a pleading which 
makes no reference to the original pleading, the result is to 
treat the original pleading as having no further validity. The 
rule has been stated thusly: 
An amended pleading that is complete in itself and makes no 
reference to nor adopts any portion of a prior pleading 
supersedes the latter. • • • The superseded pleading cannot 
be utilized to aid a defective amended pleading. 3 MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE, Sl5.08(7) (2d Ed., 1978) 
This basic principle of procedure has been recognized as 
valid and previously adopted by this Court in Teamsters, Chauffers, 
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 2 2 2 v. Motor Cargo, 5 30 P. 2c 
807 (Utah, 1974). This Court held that: 
The law is overwhelming to the effect that when an amended 
complaint, complete in and of itself, is filed, the former 
complaint is functus officio and cannot be used for any 
purpose. Id. at 808. 
The rule has been applied in other jurisdictions to amended 
answers, as well as amended complaints. Proctor & Gamble Defense 
Corp. v. Bean, 146 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir., 1945); Meyer v. State 
Board of Equalization, 267 P.2d 257, 262 (Cal., 1954); Gregio v. 
Roybal, 442 P.2d 585, 587 (N.M., 1968); Jenkins v. Donaldson, 
429 P.2d 841, 845 (Ida., 1967). 
It is evident that when Appellant amended its Answer and die 
not refer therein to its earlier pleading, the original Answer 
was no longer to be considered as having any validity or effect. 
It was as though it ceased to be a part of the record· Teamste:' 
Chauffers, l~arehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 222 v · llotor 
Cargo, supra. 
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The effect of such failure of Structo-Lite to allege iD it. 
Amended Answer the affirmative defenses of contributory aegli..-ce 
and assumption of the risk is to require a finding that Struato-
Lite waived those defenses. Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civ. Proc., 
requires a party to plead such defenses affirmatively in a 
responsive pleading such as an answer: 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively • • • assumption of risk, contributory negligence, 
• • • and any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense. (Emphasis added) 
The failure to raise an affirmative defense in a responsive 
pleading has been held by this Court to be a waiver of the right 
to raise the defense. Pratt v. Board of Education of the Uintah 
County School District, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah, 1977): Bezner 
v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah, 1976); 
General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 
545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah, 1976); Wasescha v. Terra, Inc., 528 P.2d 
802, 803 (Utah, 1974). See: Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
While this Court has also stated that Rule 15(b) of Utah 
Rules of Civ. Proc. may operate as an exception to the waiver 
provision (General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corporation, supra; Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 
381 P.2d 86 (1963)), the facts in this case do not justify the 
granting of the amendment. 
In Cheney this Court stressed that the plaintiff failed to 
~ake any representation to the trial court that he was or would 
be prejudiced or disadvantaged as a result of the evidence 
submitted by the defendant in support of an affirmative defense 
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wbich had not been raised in defendant's pleadings. Noting that 
Rule 54(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires every final 
judgaent to grant the relief to which a party is entitled, even 
if no auch relief is requested in the pleadings, this Court 
agreed that if the plaintiff was not prejudiced, conforming the 
pleadings to the evidence was proper. 
In General Insurance Company of America, supra, there was 
evidence adduced at the trial that there was a lack of considera-
tion and therefore no contract as between the plaintiff and two 
of the defendants named Butcher. After such evidence was 
received without objection, Butchers moved to amend their answer 
under Rule lS(b) to conform to the evidence. This motion was 
denied by the trial judge. In reversing the action of the lower 
court, this Court explained that Rule lS(b) has two separate 
parts: 
The first part provides that if issues are tried with the 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. 
* * * 
The first part of Rule 15(b) should be contrasted with the 
second part where an amendment is offered during trial in 
response to an objection to evidence, In such a case, the 
standards set forth in the second part of Rule 15(b) will 
apply, viz., leave may be granted in the absence of prejudi~ 
undue delay, or laches. Id. at 505-506. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Crockett agreed that 
amendments under Rule 15 (b) are subject to the court's discretic 
which should be exercised liberally in the interests of JUstice. 
But he cautioned that such amendments sf-)ould onl~· be per:-rut::cd: 
.. in such circ~mstances and upon such condi::~ons as 
will not place the adverse party at an undue disadvantage 
or result in unfairness or inJustice to him. Id. at 506. 
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Respondents respectfully submit that the trial judge abused his 
discretion when he permitted the Appellant Structo-Lite to amend 
its Amended Answer on the morning of the first day of trial to 
include defenses which Respondents had every reason to believe 
had been discarded by Appellant more than two years previous to 
that date. 
Appellant's Motion to Amend was protested vigorously by 
Respondents, who pointed out that had they been aware Appellant 
intended to raise the deleted defenses, they would have altered 
their entire strategy in preparing their case and in aligning 
the parties. (Tr. 46, 47) Clearly, the trial judge's action 
in granting Appellant's Motion goes far beyond the standard of 
"undue disadvantage" and "unfairness" espoused by Justice Crockett. 
The trial court's action becomes even more prejudicial to 
Respondents in light of the tactics used by Appellant during and 
after the trial and on appeal concerning Appellant's defense that 
Respondents assumed the risk of injury. When the trial court 
granted Appellant's Motion to add to its Amended Answer the two 
previously deleted defenses, Respondents were given to understand 
that the court permitted both defenses to be raised only because 
the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute, Utah Code Annot., 
§78-27-37, 1953, as amended, provided for similar treatment with 
respect to the defense of contributory negligence and the defense 
of assumption of the risk. 
At no time during the trial or afterwards when Appellant 
submitted its proposed instructions to the jury did Appellant 
~ssert that it was claiming the doctrine of assumption of the 
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~i~ to be anything other than a defense associated with 
ODDtributory negligence and subject to the provisions of the 
Utah Cosparative Negligence Statute. In fact, Appellant's 
p~po•ed special verdict form, which the court adopted and sub-
.ttted to the jury, instructed the jury "to apportion by 
percentage the proximate contribution, if any, of each party 
toward the loss. (Special Verdict, Question VIII)" No effort 
w•• made or attempted in that question to distinguish between 
contribution toward the loss resulting from negligence and 
contribution toward the loss resulting from assumption of the 
risk. On the contrary, the jury was free to combine the conduct 
of the Respondents with that of the Appellant in apportioning 
the percentage of "proximate contribution" of each party to the 
total damage sustained. 
Appellant never claimed until after the jury's verdict was 
entered that it intended the defense of assumption of the risk 
to be a complete bar to Respondents' right of recovery. 
Appellant's actions in this case constitute an effort on its 
part to have its pleadings conformed to fit its version of the 
jury's verdict. Appellant has attempted in its Brief to justify 
this position by claiming that it would have violated the rule 
of McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah, 1974), 
had its jury instructions apprised "the jury of the effect of 
the finding that plaintiff [Respondents] had assumed the risk 
of damage." (Appellant's Brief at 19) Respondents note, howeve! 
that Appellant is quick to argue in Point I of its Brief that 
this Court must hold assumption of the risk to be a complete bac 
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to recovery because this Cour~ in affirming Rigtrup v. Strawberry 
Water Users Association, supra, ostensibly validated jury 
instructions which say exactly what Appellant claims to be 
reversible error. (Appellant's Brief at 14, 15) 
It would be extremely prejudicial and unjust to Respondents 
for this Court to condone the methods employed by Appellant by 
holding both that the trial court properly permitted Appellant 
to amend its pleadings and that the jury's determination of 
Respondents' assumption of the risk constitutes a complete bar 
to recovery. Appellant should be estopped by its silence 
throughout the entire trial and pretrial proceedings from now 
claiming Respondents are barred from recovery by assumption of 
the risk. 
In any event, Respondents are entitled to a finding that 
the trial court abused its discretion in granting Appellant's 
Motion to Amend and a holding that Appellant waived the defenses 
of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk when it 
deleted them from its Amended Answer. 
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POIR'l' IV. TBB EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED 
TO A FINDING THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THEY DID NOT ASSUME 
'lBB RISK OF INJURY. 
At trial Appellant failed to establish a prima facie case 
in support of ita claim that Respondents assumed the risk of 
injury. A' a result, Respondents were entitled, as a matter of 
law, to an instruction that they did not assume the risk of any 
injury from Appellant's conduct, which the trial court refused 
to give. 
As submitted to the jury, the doctrine of assumption of risk 
was stated: 
There is a legal principle commonly referred to by the term 
"assumption of risk" which is as follows: 
T 
A company is said to assume risk when it voluntarily manifests 
its assent to the creation or maintenance of a dangerous 
condition and voluntarily exposes itself to that danger or 
when it knows that a danger exists in either the condition, 
use or operation of property and voluntarily accepts the 
dangerous condition and uses the dangerous product. 
Analysis of this statement reveals that before a party can 
be found to have "assumed the risk," there must be evidence to 
support the following findings: 
(a) Voluntary assent, manifested in some manner, to the 
creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition; and 
(b) Voluntary exposure to the danger; or 
(c) Knowledge that the danger exists in the condition, use 
or operation of property; and 
(d) Voluntary acceptance of the danger and use of the 
dangerous product. 
Evident from this analysis is the proposition that a partv 
must know and appreciate what the danger is and ~hat the poss1t-' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-27-
consequences may be before he can "assume the risk• of injury. 
Anything short of that cannot constitute a basis for voluntary 
action. It is also obvious that a party cannot be held account-
able under the doctrine of assumption of the risk for latent 
defects or dangers, the existence of which the party has no 
knowledge, no matter how apparent they may be after an injury 
has occurred. Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075, 1076 
(1952). 
With these principles as a background, it is clear from a 
review of the evidence presented at trial that Appellant failed 
to establish any basis for the defense, much less carry the 
burden of proof required. Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 
18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132 (1966): Peterson v. Nielsen, 9 Utah 
2d 302, 343 P.2d 731 (1959). 
Appellant made a great deal of noise at trial that Respondents 
knew the tanks had "a lot of defects," "many irregularities," "a 
lot of leaks," and that Respondents knew the tanks had been 
negligently manufactured and Defendant hadn't tested them. (Tr. 
1181-82) While the evidence does show that Respondents knew the 
tanks leaked when they were water tested, the remainder of 
Appellant's allegations are completely without foundation. 
Harvey Wright testified that while visiting the Structo-Lite 
shop, he observed two tanks standing in the yard in a vertical 
oosition, half of a third tank partially assembled in the yard 
and a quarter section on the mold in the shop. Upon examination 
of the completed tanks and the quarter section on the mold, he 
noticed that they were out-of-round. (Tr. 660, 661) Mr. Wright 
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414 DO~ measure the completed tanks but determined by visual 
iaepection only that there appeared to be a difference of three 
~ four inches in tank diameter from the high to low spot on the 
tank. (Tr. 662) Mr. Wright conveyed his observations to Harvey 
Bu~chin•on, the representative for the Conservancy District. 
Be further testified that his only concern about the out-of-
roundness of the tanks was whether the tanks would fit within 
the tolerances provided in the areas where the tanks would be 
located. (Tr. 663, 689) 
When the first four tanks were delivered to the job site, 
some of the 2 X 4 supports used for bracing had apparently failed 
in transit, causing the tanks to appear somewhat elliptical at 
one end. (Tr. 666) The failure of the 2 X 4 braces in transit 
had caused some damage to the flanges located at the top end of 
the tanks. Mr. Wright observed no damage to the interior of the 
tanks or to the middle or lower end of the tanks. (Tr. 665, 666, 
692) No evidence was presented that the out-of-roundness or 
damage to the top flange of the tanks observed by Mr. Wright 
caused him to believe or conclude that the tanks would or could 
fail if filled with liquid alum, nor was any evidence presented 
to the court to establish that the tank erupted either due to 
its out-or-roundness or to the damaged top flange, both of which 
had been repaired. On the contrary, the testimony indicated 
that the flange at the top of the tank was there for the sole 
purpose of providing a means for bolting the lid to the tank and 
not for the purpose of adding strength to it. Mo~eover, there 
was no pressure aoainst the tank lid. (Tr. 105, 112, 113) 
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After the tanks were installed, they were cleaned and 
inspected by Structo-Lite. No physical damage to the tanks vas 
observed. Mr. Bevan, the president of Structo-Lite, testified 
that after installation, the tanks were still as firm and secure 
as they had been when they left the Structo-Lite shop. (Tr. 116) 
It is clear from the foregoing that the observations of Mr. 
Wright certainly did not impart to Jacobsen information sufficient 
for a finding that Jacobsen was charged with knowledge of the 
existence of a dangerous condition which had been created in the 
layup and fabrication. There is no evidence that any other 
representative of Jacobsen noticed anything unusual with respect 
to the tanks. 
Mr. Harvey Hutchinson, engineer for the Conservancy District 
at the project, testified that he observed the tanks being 
constructed at Structo-Lite and noticed that a hand layup method 
of fabrication was being used. Mr. Hutchinson observed that the 
tanks did not all have a smooth surface and places where apparently 
the woven roving was not covered by the fiberglass matting. (Tr. 
551, 553) Mr. Hutchinson saw flat spots and irregularities on 
the tanks after they were set in the building. (Tr. 562) He 
testified that this caused him to be concerned about what would 
happen to the tanks during an earthquake. He was not concerned, 
however, that the irregularities and flat spots would cause the 
tanks to fail if filled with liquid alum. (Tr. 563) Mr. 
Hutchinson was the only representative of the Conservancy District 
who testified at the trial concerning his observations of the 
fiberglass tanks. Again, no evidence was adduced to establish 
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that the observations of Mr. Hutchinson put the Conservancy 
Diatrict on notice that the tanks were in danger of failing if 
filled with liquid alum. 
Moreover, no evidence was presented that the irregularities 
and unevenness in the surface of the fiberglass were the cause 
l 
of the tank's failure. In fact, Mr. Glen Enke, an expert produced 
by the Appellant, testified that the unevenness in the tank 
surface would ~ have caused increased stress at the thin 
spots. (Tr. 1092) 
Mr. Hutchinson also testified that at his direction American 
Testing Laboratories made several inspections of the Structo-Lite 
facilities during the time the fiberglass tanks were being 
fabricated. (Tr. 472, 473) The first report from American 
Testing described the manner of hand layup and stated the tanks 
had the "three-eighth inch minimum wall thickness as quoted by 
Mr. Bevan." (Tr. 476) This report gave Mr. Hutchinson no 
concern because the minimum wall thickness described in the 
report was more than twice as thick as that called for in the 
specifications. (Tr. 476, 477) The second report from American 
Testing Laboratories reviewed the system for joining quarter 
sections. This also caused no concern to Mr. Hutchinson. (Tr. 
477, 478) The third report from American Testing Laboratories 
indicated that Structo-Lite was stripping a layer of glass that 
did not set so that the deficient area could be reglassed. The 
report implied to Mr. Hutchinson that Structo-Lite was taking 
care of deficiencies as they proceeded ~ith fabrication of the 
tanks. (Tr. 478, 479) ~o other evidence or testimon~ with 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Mus um and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-31-
respect to the reports from American Testinq Laboratories was 
presented. The reports clearly did not cause the Conservancy 
District to determine that a possibility of failure of the alum 
tanks existed. 
The only remaininq "defect" which Appellant claims could 
have imparted knowledge to Jacobsen and the Conservancy District 
was the leaks in the tanks which appeared when the tanks were 
filled with water. 
At trial Richard Nelson, Erik Thomsen, Harvey Hutchinson, 
Stephen Jacobsen and Harvey Wright all testified to have either 
participated in the water tests conducted on the fiberqlass tanks 
or to have observed leaks in the tanks durinq the water testinq 
procedure. (Tr. 225, 441, 442, 484, 485, 626, 673, 674) No 
witness testified, however, and no other evidence was submitted 
to the trial court which indicated that anyone became concerned 
that the tanks could fail if filled with liquid alum as a result 
of the water testing and leaks. 1-tr. Hutchinson made it very 
plain that the purpose of filling the tanks with water was not 
to determine whether the tanks would withstand specified tensile 
pressures but whether the tanks had any leaks. The water test 
was a standard test done to all structures and reservoirs in the 
plant. (Tr. 485) 
After the leaks were discovered, Structo-Lite was informed. 
Structo-Lite then sent a crew to the plant to make the necessary 
repairs. (Tr. 121, 122, 486) The leaks were repaired and the 
tanks retested, at which time it was determined that they were 
\·:ater tight. (Tr. 486) 
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10 evidence was presented that the existence of the leaks 
la anr way caused or contributed to the rupture of the fiberglass 
tank. In fact, Mr. David Bevan, president of Structo-Lite, 
teatified that the tank which failed had never leaked (Tr. 119); 
and Mr. Glen Bnke, Appellant's expert witness, testified that a 
bole in a tank aide wall would not cause the tank to rupture. 
(Tr. 1094) 
It is clear that Respondents did not acquire or possess the 
requi•ite knowledge that the tanks were in danger of failing 
because they leaked. Appellant's claim that Respondents assumed 
the risk because they observed leaks or irregularities or 
unevenness in the tanks' surface must fail because Appellant did 
not provide any evidence whatsoever at the trial that Respondents' 
observations gave rise to a knowledge in the Respondents or an 
appreciation by the Respondents that the tanks were otherwise 
defective and did not have the necessary tensile strength to 
hold liquid alum when filled. Without a knowledge and apprecia-
tion of the possible dangers, Respondents cannot be found to 
have voluntarily assumed any risks inherent in those same dangers. I 
Appellant also claimed at trial that in viewing all of the 
"defects" in the tanks, Respondents must have known that the 
tanks were negligently manufactured and therefore a dangerous 
product. However, no testimony was elicited and no evidence 
was produced to show that the defects and irregularities had any 
relationship to the defects which caused the rupture, or even 
that any representative of the Conservancy District or Jacobsen 
ever determined or concluded that the irregularities they 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-33-
observed meant that the tanks were negligently or defectiv.ly 
manufactured and were therefore unsafe. 
It is true that evidence concerning 
of the tanks was so overwhelming,the trial court directed a 
verdict with respect to that issue. However, a careful reading 
of the transcript reveals that the basis for the judge's decision 
lay not with the minor and insignificant visual imperfections 
in the tanks, but rather with the internal composition and 
construction of the walls. The evidence showed that the tank 
walls were poorly constructed. They did not even contain the 
number of layers of fiberglass material which Mr. Bevan,as 
president of Structo-Lite,testified would be necessary to insure 
safety. (Tr. 125, 221, 1257) The real problems with the tanks 
lay not in what could be observed by the naked eye,but within 
the structure of the tanks themselves. Again, no evidence was 
presented that Respondents had any knowledge or conception of 
the poor quality of the workmanship hidden within the tank walls 
or the resulting possible dangers. Clearly, Appellant failed 
even to provide sufficient evidence to the court so as to make 
the question one for a factual determination by the jury. 
Respondents did not assume, either voluntarily or with knowledge, 
any risk of injury. The lower court therefore erred when it 
permitted the question of Respondents' assumption of the risk 
to go to the jury for determination. That error should be 
corrected by this Court. 
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POINT V. RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLTED TO A FINDING, AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, THAT THEY WERE NOT CONTRIBUTORILY 
NEGLIGENT. 
Following the close of Appellanes case, Respondents 
also requested the judge to rul~ as a matter of la~ that 
Respondents were not contributorily negligent. Respondents 
also requested the trial judge to so instruct the jury. Both 
requests were denied by the court, which denials were in error, 
as a thorough review of the transcript and evidence reveals. 
At trial Appellant claimed that Respondents were negligent 
in the following particulars: 
(a) Respondents adopted and accepted inadequate tank 
specifications and an improper building design. 
(b) The tanks were of such poor quality that Respondents 
should have known this from observing the tanks. 
(c) Respondents knew that Appellant did not test the 
tanks. 
(d) Respondents failed properly to inspect or test the 
fiberglass tanks. 
An examination of the evidence presented at trial again 
shows that Appellant did not establish that its claims of 
contributory negligence had any factual basis. 
The claims of Appellant outlined in paragraph (a) are 
identical to the claims Appellant made against Templeton, Linke 
and Associates in its third-party complaint; namely, that the 
specifications for the storage tanks were incorrect and inadequate 
and that the building design was deficient. At trial Appellant 
claimed that Respondents were also negllgent because they accerte 
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Linke and Associates. 
The issue of Templeton, Linke and Associate's negligence 
was presented to the jury, which found that Templeton, Linke 
and Associates was not negligent. It must be concluded therefraa 
that the jury could not have determined that Respondents 
were negligent in accepting the tank specifications and 
building design, having already determined that they were neither 
inadequate nor improper. Appellant did not appeal the jury's 
decision with respect to Templeton, Linke and Associates; 
therefore, Respondents presume that the issues of the tank 
specifications and improper building design are not before this 
Court for review. 
This leaves for purposes of this appeal the questions of 
whether Respondents should have noticed the poor quality of 
the tanks and who had responsibility for making inspections. 
In both of these particulars Appellant failed to establish 
the necessary elements of contributory negligence. 
As with the doctrine of assumption of the risk, before 
Respondents can be found to have been negligent in their 
acceptance and use of the tanks, Respondents must have had 
knowledge that it was dangerous to use the tanks for the purposes 
for which they were fabricated. Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 209, 282, p.2d 304 (1955). In other words, 
Respondents must have realized that filling the tanks with 
liquid alum would cause them to fail. As has been heretofore de-
~ailed i~ ~his Brief, Appellant failed to present any evidence 
~hatsoever that Respondents knew that the tanks could fail. 
~lth respect to Appellant's claim that the tanks were so 
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poorly constructed, Respondents should have known they would 
fail, Respondents point out that while the evidence at trial 
vas overwheLming in establishing the poor quality of workmanship 
in the tanks, none of the evidence presented confirms Appellant's 
theory that the defects in the tanks were anything but latent. 
In considering how the tanks appeared to Respondents when they 
were completed and installed at the Water Treatment Plant, it 
must be kept in mind that the standard of care in judging negligence 
is based on what the law requires of an ordinary, reasonable and 
prudent person under the circumstance. This test is based on 
foresight and not what may appear obvious by hindsight. 
Exceptional skill, foresight and caution are admirable traits, 
but are not the required standard of conduct. Larsen v. Johnson 
21 Utah 2d 92, 440 P.2d 886 (1968); Hadley v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 
366, 345 P.2d 197 (1959); Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad CQ,, 
3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P. 2d 335 (1955). 
Reviewing the testimony and evidence presented at trial, it 
is clear that Appellant did not present any evidence to show that 
Respondents' decision to install and use the tanks after observing 
them was unreasonable. The tank did not rupture because of out-
of-roundness, or because of an uneven or irregular outside surface, 
or because the lid flanges at the tops of the tanks were damaged 
in transit, or because some of the tanks had leaks in the 
bottom portions which were completely repaired by Structo-Lite. 
Moreover, no testimony or evidence was presented to establish 
that any of these were more than minor irregularities, much less 
"defects; which should have put Respondents on notice. Dr. Ken~e: 
DeVries, an expert ln flberglass lamination and c~nstruction, W35 
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able to determine that the tanks were of poor quality by a 
careful visual examination after the one tank had ruptured. 
(TR.266). However, there is no evidence that Respondents, 
all of whom were unskilled and unfamiliar in fiberqlass 
fabrication, should be held to the same abilitiy of observation 
exhibited by Dr. DeVries. Moreover, the defects observed by 
Dr. DeVries-~uch failure of the resin to properly adhere, 
improper use of the catalys~ excessive delamination and the 
lack of uniformity in wall thickness--had not and could not 
have been observed by Respondents prior to the rupturinq of 
the tank. (Tr. 266). The defects in the tank which actually 
caused it to burst--the lack of sufficient tensile strenqth, 
the improper mix of glass and resin, the insufficient layers of 
glass matting and woven roving--were not defects which could be 
observed, even by an experienced eye, but were defects of a 
latent nature, hidden beneath the surface of the tanks. Appellant 
did not submit any evidence to establish that Respondents did 
or should have observed such defects. 
The last claim of Appellant is that Respondents knew Appellant 
did not test the tanks for tensile strength; therefore, Respondents 
were obligated to make the necessary tests. Contrary to Appellant's 
assertion that Respondents knew Appellant had made no tests of 
the tanks, there was no testimony or evidence adduced at 
trial to support such a claim. The trial transcript clearly 
reveals that none of the witnesses even discussed the matter with 
Structo-Lite. (Tr.222, 564,664). Turning to the final point 
ca1sed by Appellant, that Respondents should have tested the 
tanks themselves and that hydrostatic testing was insufficient 
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to determine the tensile strengths of the tanks, Respondents 
direct this Court's attention again to the infirmity which 
inflicts all of Appellant's defenses: namely, Appellant failed 
to adduce any evidence at trial that Respondents had any duty 
to test the tanks or their failure to test was in any way 
unreasonable. 
With respect to the hydrostatic testing performed by 
Respondents, the evidence is uncontroverted that its sole purpose 
was to determine whether the tanks had any leaks, not to test 
for tensile strength. (Tr. 484, 485) 
As to the issue of whether Respondents should have tested 
the tanks, Respondents note that the following uncontroverted 
facts were adduced at trial: 
1. Jacobsen, as general contractor, had no authority to 
conduct any tests or inspections at all on the materials or 
workmanship at the Jordan Water Treatment Plant. All testing, 
inspection and approval of materials and work was ultimately the 
responsibility of Templeton, Linke and Associates, the project 
engineer. (Exhibit 3-D-22, particularly paragraphs I.A.ll--
contractor to work with direction of engineer; I.A.35--engineer 
to give all orders and directions and to determine acceptability 
of materials; I.B.ll--all work and materials subject to inspectic: 
• I 
by engineer; I.B.l2--fabricated materials to be approved by eng1neo• 
2. The right to select an independent testing or inspectior. 
agency was permitted to the Conservancy District. (Exhibit 3-o-:: 
paragraph I .A. 7.) 
3. In exercising its right under paragraph I.A.7. of the 
contract specifications, the Conservanc~ District arranged to 
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have American Testing Laboratory inspect the fabrication -.~~~• 
and facilities of Structo-Lite. (Tr.472). 
4. Neither Jacobsen nor the Conservancy District had any 
previous experience with fiberglass cons.truction. (l'r. 350, 465, 642). 
5. Structo-Lite held itself out to be fiberglass 
engineers and knowledgeable in the construction and fabrication 
of fiberglass products (Tr. 4, 13, 335, 336). 
6. Harvey Hutchinson of the Conservancy District made 
substantial efforts to determine what could be done to insure 
that the tanks would be satisfactory, including contacting a 
former supervisor in California who told him that when performance 
specifications were involved, testing was generally left to the 
fiberglass fabricator. (Tr. 556). 
7. Mr. Hutchinson had no knowledge on how to perform tests 
on the completed tanks or how to cut samples for such tests. 
(Tr. 556, 557). 
8. Mr. Hutchinson believed that Mr. Bevan as a fiberglass 
engineer would perform the necessary tests in the normal process 
of manufacturing the tanks. (Tr. 564). 
In addition to these undisputed facts, Mr. Peter G. 
Russell, an expert in fiberglass fabrication with Thiokol 
Corporation, testified that it was common practice to deliver 
performance specifications to a fiberglass fabricator, obtain 
certification that the product would be built to specifications, 
then accept and use the product without having investigated the 
fabricator's capacity or plant (Tr. 1230, 1238). Mr. Arnold 
'.i. Coon, a consulting engineer and head of a local engineering 
~1:·:1'., testified that it was common practice when dealing with 
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performance specifications to obtain a certification from 
the manufacturer, such as that prepared by Structo-Lite, and 
then rely on the expertise of the manufacturer for the end 
result. (Tr. 1189, 1194). The only evidence presented by 
Appellant at the trial revelant to the issue of testing the 
tanks was the testimony of Mr. Glen Enke, retired Professor of 
Engineering at Brigham Young University. Mr. Enke testified that 
because of his experience on the Utah State Board of Engineer~ he 
would investigate the background of anyone who claimed to be 
an engineer (Tr. 1014, 1015, 1016), and that the project engineer 
(Templeton, Linke and Associates) would have breached its duty 
of care to the owner if it failed to determine what tests the 
fabricator (Structo-Lite) intended to perform on the tanks or 
to specify the test itself. (Tr. 960, 962, 964). At no time, 
however, did Appellant proffer any evidence as to the standard 
of care which should be applied to Jacobsen as the contractor 
on the project to the Conservancy District, as owner, to see 
that proper tests are performed, or to deal with individuals 
who represented themselves as engineers, when they did not 
have the benefit of 14 years experience on the Utah State Board 
of Engineers as did Professor Enke. The standard by which 
Respondents' acts are to be measured is the conduct of the ordinar: 
prudent person under similar circumstances and conditions, 57 
Am. Jur. 2d,Negligence 337, not a standard of exceptional skill, 
foresight and caution. Hadlev \". Wood, Supra. 
Appellant not only failed to carry its burden of proof 
at trial with respect to its alleged defense of contributory 
negligence, Appellant did not succeed i:1 pro•;:_dina an:.· e•Jicenti3:: 
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foundation on which a finding of contributory negligence 
could be based. This Court should hold that the lower court 
erred in permitting the jury to determine an issue which 
should have been resolved as a matter of law. 
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POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
RBSPOilDBH'l'S 1 MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO ALLEGE AS 
A11 ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR RELIEF THE WILLFUL AND RECKLESS 
co•DUC'l' OP APPELLANT. 
A~ the close of Appellan~'s case, Respondents asked the 
cour~ for permission to amend their Complaint under Rule lS(b) 
~ conform to the evidence adduced at the trial which showed 
that Appellant was guilty of gross negligence or willful and 
reckless conduct in the construction of the fiberglass tanks. 
This Motion was denied by the trial judge, which Respondents 
claim was error. 
T 
There is no doubt that under Rule lS(b), Utah Rules of Civil ' 
Procedure, if issues are tried with the express or 
of the parties, then at the request of a party the 
implied consent I 
pleadings 
shall be amended to conform to the evidence. General Insurance I 
Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., supra. "Implied 
consent" is found within the meaning of the rule whenever evidence 
is admitted at the trial without objection from the opposing 
party. 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, U5.13[2], pp. 15-168 to 
15-170 (2d Ed., 1979). 
Respondents submit that the testimony and evidence adduced 
at the trial as herein delineated was sufficient to raise an 
issue that Appellant was grossly negligent and acted willfully 
and recklessly in constructing the fiberglass storage tanks. 
David Bevan, president of Structo-Lite, testified that in 
laying up the fiberglass tanks, the workers would know if they 
missed a spot. (Tr. 193) A miss, therefore, would have to be 
purposeful. Dr. DeVries' examination of the tanks, including 
the ruptured tank, clearly indicated that numerous spots on the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provi ed by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-43-
tanks were missed. (Tr. 266) Even more serious, Mr. Bevan 
testified that he never read the specifications prepared by 
Templeton, Linke and Associates; he never performed any tests 
on his tanks and he didn't even know what the term •tensile 
strength" meant. (Tr. 171, 190, 193) This did not hinder him 
from representing to Jacobsen that he was an expert in fiberglass 
or from preparing and delivering a letter to Jacobsen in which 
he warranted that the tanks would meet specifications he knew 
he had neither read nor could understand (Tr. 179; Exh. 10, 11), 
the specifications for construction of the tanks. Such conduct 
was termed by Professor Enke, Structo-Lite's own expert, •reck-
less." (Tr. 1055, 1067) 
The defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of 
the risk are not available to a defendant who is guilty of gross 
negligence or reckless conduct. Respondents should have been 
granted their request to have the jury determine whether 
Appellant was in fact guilty of gross negligence, recklessness 
or willful misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully urge this Court to reject Appellant's 
claim that Respondents are not entitled to recover, but on the 
contrary are entitled to recover the full amount of their damages 
as found by the jury, together with interest and costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~- ~ 
/ ') • ~/;. 7 /e)/-:--:-'///,-./ y/ j,;p.._./_.;/~ 
~rthu~ H. Nielsen · 
w. Waldan Lloyd --
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
400 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Edward w. Clyde 
CLYDE & PRATT 
315 South State 
Salt Lake City, 
Street 
Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Brief of Respondents by delivering two 
copies thereof to Raymond M. Berry and H. James Clegg, Snow, 
Christensen and Martineau, Attorneys for Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff-Appellant, at 700 Continental Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
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